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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

Pardon: Consent not necessary: Power of the President to
commute death sentence to imprisonment for life: To benefit the
public welfare*
This was a habeas corpus proceeding brought by Vuco Perovish
(plaintiff) against W. I. Biddle, Warden of the United States Penitentiary at Leavenworth. On questions of law certified by Circuit
Court of Appeals, reviewing judgment of District Court ordering
relator discharged.
Plaintiff in' this case has been convicted in Alaska of murder; the
verdict being that he was "guilty of murder in the first degree and
that he should suffer death." The time set for his execution was
September I5, 1905, which judgment was affirmed by the higher
court. Perovish v. United States, 205 U.S. 86, 27 S.Ct. 456, 51 L.
Ed. 722.
Respites were granted from time to time, and on June 5, 1909,
President Taft executed a document by which he purported to "commute the sentence of the said plaintiff from death to imprisonment
for life in a penitentiary to be designated by the attorney general
of the United States." Thereupon the plaintiff was transferred from
jail in Alaska to a penitentiary in Washington and some years later
to one in Leavenworth, Kansas. In November, 1918, the plaintiff
reciting that his sentence has been commuted to imprisonment for life,
applied for a pardon which was denied. This act was repeated and
the result was the same. So on February 20, 1925, he filed in the
District Court for the District of Kansas an application for a writ
of habeas corpus on the grounds that his removal from the jail to
the penitentiary and the order of the President were without his
consent and without legal authority.
The question under consideration is: Did the president have authority to commute the sentence of Perovish from death to imprisonment for life? And did he necessarily have to have his consent?
The counsel for the plaintiff contended that when the attempt is to
commute a punishment to one of a different sort is cannot be done
without the convict's consent. He cited Burdick v. United States
236 U.S. 79, 35 S.Ct. 267, 59 L.Ed. 476. in which it said: "A
pardon is an act of grace proceeding from the power intrusted with
the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual on whom
it bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has
committed. It is a private though official act of the executive magistrate delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended." He
also cited State v. Wilson, 7 Pet. (U.S.) 150. The effect of a pardon
on whom it is offered the condition of its consummation this was said:
"A pardon is a deed to the validity of which delivery is essential,
and delivery is not completed without acceptance and if rejected by
the person for whom it is intended the Court has no power to inforce it."
The better rule is stated in this case by Justice Holmes in which
he said: "A pardon in our days is not a private act of grace from
an individual happening to possess power. It is a part of the constitutional scheme. When it is granted it is the determination of
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ultimate authority that the public welfare will be better served by
inflicting less than the judgment fixed.-(See ex parte Crossmnan, 267
U.S. 87, 120, 121; 45 S.Ct. 332; 69 L. Ed. 527; 38 A.L.R. 131.
Geneally a convict cannot demand a pardon. Yet a person may
contract with the stated under certain condition and on the fulfillment of those requirements the state may grant a pardon on the basis
of the previous contract. There was no contract in this case to that
effect and the state owed the convict no obligation, therefore he could
not say what should be done in this case.
When we come to the commutation of death to imprisonment for life
it is very difficult to see how consent has any more to do with it
than a pardon in full. Supposing that Perovish did not accept the
change, he could not have got himself hanged against the executive
orders. Supposing that he did accept, he could not affect judgment
to be carried out. The consideration that led to the modification had
nothing to do with his will.
The last question: Did the president have power to change the
sentence or in other words was the substituted punishment authorized
by law or did it come within the scope of the words of the constitution, Article 2, sec. 2, which says "the President shall have power
to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States
except in the case of treason?" This section gives the President
power to grant clemency in all cases except treason. And that it is
left within his discretion to impose a lesser penalty for a greater
punishment when the public welfare will be better served by inflicting
a less punishment than fixed by the judgment.
There is no doubt that his power extended to this case as it is
an evidential fact that imprisonment for life is a less penalty than
death. It was treated so under the statute under which Perovish was
tried. Which provides that "the jury may qualify their verdict
(guilty of murder) by adding thereto without capital punishment;
and whenever the jury shall return a verdict qualified as aforesaid
the person convicted shall be sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor
for life criminal code of Alaska, Act of March 3, 1899 c. 429, P. 4;
30 Stat. 1253. See ex parte Wells, I8 How. 307, 15 L. Ed. 42I; ex
Parte Crossman, 267 U.S. 87, 109 45 S.Ct. 332, 69 L. Ed. 527, 38 A.
L.R. 131. The opposite answer would permit the President to decide
that justice requires the diminution of a term of fine without consulting the convict, but would deprive him in most cases of the power and
require him to permit an execution which he has decided ought not
to take place unless the change is agreed to by one who on no sound
principle ought to have any voice in what the law should do for the
welfare of the whole. It is evident that the opinion that the doctrine
of Burdick v. United States does not extend to the present case.
PAUL COLEMAN

Constitutional Law: State Sterilization Law Not Contrary to the
Fourteenth Amendment Giving Due Process and Equal Protection
of the Law.
What is meant by tlf6 provision against cruel and unusual punishment? It is hard to say definitely. Within the pale of due process the
legislature has power to define crimes and fix punishments, great though

